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Tort Liability of the Ohio Pleasure Boat Owner
RECENT YEARS, pleasure boating has become one of the
most popular recreational activities in the United States. The
small boat enthusiast in Ohio has access to the waters of Lake Erie
and the Ohio River, as well as a number of other suitable rivers and
state-owned lakes which cover more than 50,000 acres.' Owing to
the fact that at the dose of 1964 there were 150,415 boats registered within the state,' it is quite evident that many Ohioans are taking full advantage of the waterways in pursuit of this pleasurable
activity.

IN

Although there has not been a great amount of litigation involving pleasure craft, it is reasonable to assume that as participation in
boating continues to increase, property damage and personal injury
litigation will also increase. Since a large segment of Ohio pleasure boating occurs on "navigable waters,"' many of these tort claims
will be governed by maritime law.
The purpose of this Note is to review some of the more important principles governing maritime torts,4 the peculiar remedies that
may be available to a boater, and the forums in which these remedies may be asserted. In addition, the watercraft and navigation
laws of Ohio will be discussed where applicable to the maritime tort
area, and more specifically in conjunction with a discussion of the
safety regulations applicable to pleasure boating. Since the average pleasure boater does not today employ seamen, and since there
are relatively few cases of actions for injuries to seamen or other
employees on pleasure boats, the various compensation laws and
remedies applicable only to seamen will not be considered, i.e., the
Jones Act,7 the doctrine of unseaworthiness, the doctrine of main1. OHo DEP'T OF HIGHwAYs, THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF OHno (1965).
2. Letter From The Ohio Division of Watercraft to the Author, March 1, 1965.

See

also U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP'T OF TREASURY, RECREATIONAL BOATING IN THE

UNVE STATES (CG-357) 3-5 (1964).
3. For a definition of "navigable waters" see note 11 infra.
4. Maritime torts are defined as civil
wrongs committed on navigable waters. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. City of New York, 135 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cit. 1943).
5. .OHIo REV. CODE ch. 1547 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
6. See Annot., 63 A.LR.2d 343, 349 (1959).
7. 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958); see generally GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 279-315 (1957).
8. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 315-32; Note, Extension
of the UnseaworthinessRemedy to Longshoremen - Triuaph of Doctrine Over Statute,

15 W. REs.L Rv.753 (1964).
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tenance and cure,9 and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act of 1927.1"
I.

JURISDICTION: CHOICE OF FORUM
AND APPLICABLE LAW

Torts involving a pleasure boater may be governed by either
federal admiralty law" or the common law of the state. The
locality of the occurrence of the tort determines this question: torts
committed upon navigable waters fall within the ambit of federal
admiralty jurisdiction provided they involve a vessel, 1 2 and torts
committed on non-navigable waters 3 of the state are governed by
4
the common law of the state.1
There are areas where both state and federal law may be applied. These areas involve rights granted by the state which are
9. GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 253-79.
10. 44 Star. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958); see generally GILMORE &
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 337-58.
11. "Briefly, the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends to all waters, salt
or fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial, which are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce, whether or not the particular body of water is wholly
within a state and whether or not the occurrence or transaction that is the subject matter
of the suit is confined to one state." GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 28-29;
see Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. Applachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377 (1940); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903); The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870); Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938 (9th Cit. 1950).
In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), the
Supreme Court first applied the doctrine that jurisdiction in admiralty extends to all
waters that are navigable in fact.
The Ohio Watercraft Act defines "navigable waters" to mean "waters which come
under the ... department of the army of the United States and any waterways within
or adjacent to this state, except inland lakes having neither a navigable inlet or outlet"
CODE § 1547.01 (J). The act defines "waters of this state" to mean "all streams, lakes,
ponds, marshes, water courses, waterways, springs, irrigation systems, drainage systemi
and all other bodies of water, surface or underground, natural or artificial, which are
situated wholly or partially within the state .... " CODE § 1547.01 (I).
12. The word "vessel" includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. 1 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1958); see generally GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, 29-30. A craft
under construction may not be a "vessel" until launched, Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183
U.S. 424 (1902); but may remain a "vessel" although temporarily removed from the
water for repairs. New Bedford Drydock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96 (1922).
13. A body of water wholly within the confines of a state and without any inlets or
outlets to navigable waters is not subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. E.g., Shogry
v. Lewis, 225 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1964), noted in 37 TEMP. L.Q. 534 (1964);
Petition of Madsen, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); see Sovel, Determining the
Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Territorial Waters, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 479
(1964).
14. Commonwealth v. King, 150 Mass. 221, 22 N.E. 905 (1889); Stapp v. The
Steamboat Clyde, 43 Minn. 192, 45 N.W. 430 (1890). However, it appears that nothing precludes a state from adopting general maritime principles as part of its common
law. See Sovel, supra note 13, at 492.
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either not found in maritime law 5 or which supplement maritime
law,' 6 provided they are not inconsistent with or limit federal admiralty principles. This has been called the "gap" theory."7 The
most common application of this theory occurs in cases brought under state death acts where there exists no corresponding federal
right'" Actions based on state-created rights under the "gap" theory
may be asserted in federal admiralty courts"9 as well as federal and
state common law courts.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that the district courts "shall
have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right
of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it."2 This means that where an admiralty remedy is elected
the case must proceed in the admiralty court, and where a common
law remedy is elected the case may proceed in any competent common law court, state or federal, as well as in the admiralty courts.
Spedfically, the common law remedy saved to suitors is the right to
proceed in personam wherever the common law is competent to
give a remedy, while the right to proceed in2 civil causes in rem is
an exclusive remedy of the admiralty courts. '
In cases of maritime tort, a plaintiff may elect to institute an
in rem action in the admiralty court against the vessel despite the
fact that its value may be quite low as in the case of many pleasure
boats.2 2 Jurisdiction in admiralty does not depend on diversity of
citizenship or on the amount involved in the suit.23 However, since
there is no form of action at common law which can be regarded
15. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868).
16. Woods v. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., 14 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Fla.
1936); see GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 43-45.
17. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955);
Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957); see also
Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 661, 701 (1963).
18. E.g., The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); see generally GILMORE & BLACK, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 43; Cohan, Law and Practicalitiesfor Yachtsmen, 32 TEMP. L.Q.
241, 253 (1959); Note, Pleasure Boating and the Admiralty jurisdiction, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 724, 735 (1958).
19. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); see generally 1 BENEDIcr, ADMIRALTY

§ 148 (6th ed. 1940).
This statute has been rephrased and,
(Emphasis added.)
20. 1 Stat. 77 (1789).
codified into positive law. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
21. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); see generally GILMORE &
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 18; 1 NoRRIs, LAW OF SEAMEN § 23 (1951).
22. Allsman v. Rhodes, 37 F. Supp. 122 (E.D. La. 1941); The Hunstanworth, 4 F.
Supp. 656 (B.D.N.Y. 1933).
23. 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 19, § 2.
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as concurrent to an admiralty proceeding in rem against a vessel,
actions in rem against a vessel must be filed in the admiralty court. 4
The plaintiff may also elect to institute an action in personam
against the owner of the vessel, 25 and if he so elects he may file his
action in the admiralty court,26 the law side of the federal district
court, provided there is diversity of citizenship and the amount of
the claim exceeds $10,000, or in a state court.27 He may also elect
to proceed in rem against the vessel and in personam against the
owner simultaneously.2 8
If the action is instituted in either a federal or state civil court, a
party may have a jury trial, notwithstanding the fact that the principles of maritime law may be controlling." However, there is no
right to a jury trial in the admiralty courts whether the action be
in rem or in personam.3 ° Although there is no jury in the admiralty
courts, there is concurrent jurisdiction between the admiralty courts
and the law courts, provided the remedy sought is one existing at
common law or a statutory modification of the common law.3
In all maritime accident and collision cases, Ohio has provided
for in personam jurisdiction and extraterritorial service of process
upon nonresident operators of watercraft operating upon the territorial waters of the state, and upon nonresident owners of watercraft if the craft is operated on the waters of the state with the owner's consent. A nonresident who operates a watercraft upon the
waters of Ohio is deemed to have appointed the secretary of state as
his lawful attorney upon whom may be served a summons in any
action against him growing out of any accident or collision in which
the nonresident may be involved while operating a watercraft on
the waters of the state. 2 The federal courts, both in admiralty or
on the law side, may also obtain in personam jurisdiction over non24. Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1933); The Glide, 167 U.S. 606
(1897).
25. See GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 366, 382.
26. 1 BENEDICt, op. cit. supra note 19, § 2.
27. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp, Stout
& Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 186
(1871).
28. FED. ADMIRALTY R. 14.
29. 1 NORRIs, op. cit. supra note 21, § 23.
30. There is one exception to this rule. If either party demands a jury in a case involving a commercial vessel on the Great Lakes in excess of twenty tons, the case may
be tried to a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1958).
31. Panama R.R. v. Vasquea, 271 U.S. 557 (1926).
32. CODE § 154736.
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resident defendants by using the procedure prescribed by the Ohio
long-arm statute.33
Since both large commercial craft and small pleasure boats are
operated upon navigable waters, it seems that uniformity with respect to navigation rules and regulations is most desirable to prevent confusion. To promote uniformity in the field of maritime
law, all courts, whether state or federal, are constitutionally required
to apply the applicable principles of federal admiralty law. 4 Therefore, plaintiff's forum shopping will not defeat the right of the
owner of a boat to limit his liability to the value of his interest in
the boat if the owner can establish that he was without fault, nor
can it prevent the apportionment of damages, notwithstanding the
plaintiff's contributory negligence.
II.

TORT LIABILITY

Generally, the owner of a pleasure boat may be held personally
liable for all torts connected with the navigation and management
of his boat. 5 Under maritime law, the person in charge of a vessel
must at all times exercise "due diligence" and "maritime skill" to
avoid injury to others.3" Due diligence and maritime skill not only
refer to the observance of the numerous rules and regulations of
navigation and safety, but also to the prudent operation of a boat in
conformity with the requisite measures of precaution as dictated by
the particular customs of the various waterways.3" Today, the great
body of obligatory rules imposed on pleasure boaters are codified in
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd., 127 F. Supp. 945, 948
(E.D.La. 1954).
34. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); see Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transadantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S.
556 (1954); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). For an excellent discussion of this constitutional
requirement see Stolz, supra note 17. Except in relation to specific statutory remedies,
the right to sue is limited under the doctrine of laches. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956). However, in actions based on a state statute, the admiralty
courts will be bound by the statute's period of limitations. Levinson v. Deupree, 345
U.S. 648 (1953).
35. Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 99 (1876); see also 49 OHIO JuR. 2d
Shipping and Watercraft § 6 (1961).
36. Wilson v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 276 U.S. 454 (1928); The Adventuress, 214
Fed. 834 (D. Mass. 1914); Cloke v. Coney Island, Inc., 56 Ohio App. 384, 10 N.E.2d
1009 (1937); see also 14 AM. JURL PROOF OF FACrs ANNOT. Motorboat Accidents
§ 6 (1964); 49 OHio JuR. 2d op. cit. supra note 35, §§ 26-27.
37. The City of Washington, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 31 (1875); Boyce v. The Steamboat
Empress, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 173 (1845).
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both federal and state statutes,"s and in regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies 9 charged with responsibility for boating and
maritime safety. Although most statutes specify which vessels are
subject to the particular rule or regulation, it is mandatory for the
boater to be familiar with those pertaining to his type of vessel as
well as any special local regulations in effect regarding the waterways on which he operates his craft.4"
As a general rule, violation of any of the obligatory rules of
navigation and safety is a fault. Any injury which may be attributed
to a fault renders the vessel liable, but it does not fix liability as a
matter of law, for if the defendant can show that the fault could not
have possibly contributed to the injury the nonobservance of the
rule becomes immaterial. 4 '
The Ohio Watercraft Act42 incorporates many of the regulatory
provisions of the federal motorboat acts of 194041 and 1958." However, under section 1547.34 of the Ohio Revised Code a violation of
any of the prescribed operation and safety regulations contributing
to or resulting in injury to persons or damage to property constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. 4' There is no corresponding provision in the federal motorboat acts for civil liability. The
federal acts merely provide certain standards to be complied with
by the boater and for penal sanctions for any violations thereof. Although there are cases where recovery for injuries was allowed under general admiralty principles for violation of the standards imposed by the motorboat acts, 40 there is also authority that violations
38. E.g., Navigation Rules for Great Lakes and Their Connecting and Tributary
Waters (Great Lakes Rules), 28 Stat. 645 (1895), 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1958),
Navigation Rules for Red River of the North and Rivers Emptying into Gulf of Mexico
and Tributaries (Western River Rules), REv. STAT. § 4233 (1875), as amended, 33
U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1958); CODE §§ 1547.02-.37.
39. E.g., Pilot Rules promulgated by the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. 33
C.F.R. §§ 80.01-80.38 (1962). For special rules and regulations promulgated by the
Ohio Division of Watercraft see note 121 infra.
40. See authorities cited at note 37 supra.
41. A vessel charged with the violation of a rule must assume the burden of showing
that her violation could not have contributed to the accident (commonly referred to as
the "Pennsylvania rule"). The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873); see,
e.g., The Aurora, 64 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. La. 1945), af!d sub nom. Loje v. Protich, 153

F.2d
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

224 (5th Cir. 1946).
CODE ch. 1547.
54 Star. 163 (1940), 46 U.S.C. §§ 526-526(u) (1958).
72 Star. 1754-58 (1958), 46 U.S.C. §§ 527-527(h) (1958).
CODE § 1547.34.
E.g., Rogers v. Saeger, 247 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1957) (outboard motorboat with

improper lights); The Jumping Jack, 55 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1932)
boat without lights).

(anchored motor-
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of these standards confer no right of action for damages in favor of
any individual aggrieved as a result of such violations. 47 However,
where the Ohio Watercraft Act incorporates the federal standards it
would seem that, under the theory that state law may supplement
federal admiralty principles, an Ohio plaintiff may assert state
created rights in a federal admiralty court.4 8
A.

Limitation of Liability

Congress has provided that "the liability of the owner of any
vessel . . . for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any
act, matter or thing.., without the privity or knowledge of such
owner... shall not... exceed the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in such vessel... ."" The purpose of adopting this provision was to place the maritime industry of the United States on
an equal economic footing with foreign competitors, and to thereby
encourage the development of a strong merchant marine fleet by
avoiding the possibility of a merchant entrepreneur risking his entire fortune.50 Although there appears to be little or no connection
between the purpose of this statute and pleasure boats, it nevertheless has been successfully applied to pleasure craft in a considerable
number of cases5 ' despite some strong criticism." The Limitation
of Liability Act53 allows the owner of a boat to limit his liability
for damages for personal injury or property damage to the value
of the boat after the accident.5 4 However, there is one important
proviso: the owner must show that he had no "privity or knowl,edge" of the fault which caused the accident. Privity here is re47. See Godinez v. Jones, 179 F. Supp. 135 (D.P.R. 1959), noted in 37 TEMP. LQ.
529 (1964).
48. See note 16 supra; see also 49 OHIO JUR. 2d, op. cit. supra note 35, § 19.
49. 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1958). For an excellent analysis of this act and other related aspects of the subject see Note, Limitation
of LiabilityAct - Coverage of the Ship Owner, 14 W. RES. L. REv. 361 (1963).
50. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 663-67 (1957); Harolds, Limitalion of Liability and Its Application to PleasureBoats, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 423, 424 (1964),
51. E.g., Emerson v. Holloway Concrete Prod. Co., 282 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1960);
Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney, 279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1960); Rapp v. Wittwer, 255 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1958); Schoremoyer v. Barnes, 190 F.2d 14 (5th Cir.
1951); Warnken v. Moody, 22 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1927); Petition of Read, 224 F.
Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963); Petition of Hocking, 158 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1958);
Petition of Liebler, 19. F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
52. See GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 50, at 700; Harolds, supra note 50, at
444; Stolz, supra note 17, at 707.
53. 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §5 181-89 (1958).
54. City of Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d 110 (3d Cit. 1929); see generally GILMORE &
BLACK, op. cit. supra note 50, at 663.
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garded as the direct participation by the owner in some fault or
neglect which caused or contributed to the loss or injury;" knowledge means the personal cognizance which the owner has of the
condition which caused the accident. "6 Therefore, the owner must
in no way be a party to the fault causing the accident if he is to be
successful in limiting this liability under the act.
Procedurally, the owner seeking to limit his liability must either:
(1) file a petition in the federal admiralty court within six months
after a claim has been filed against him, or after he has received
written notice of such a claim;5 7 or (2) assert this right in a state
or federal civil court as an affirmative defense to a damage action
filed against him. 8 But the ultimate question of the right to limit
liability is reserved to the admiralty court. 9 If the owner seeks to
limit his liability in a federal admiralty court, all separate suits filed
against him will be consolidated. Therefore, all suits filed against
him in either state or federal courts will be enjoined and those who
have brought suits must then file claims in the admiralty court
limitation proceeding. "
A case involving an accident on Lake Erie illustrates the profound ramifications of applying the limitation statute to pleasure
boats. 6 In this case, a fourteen year old girl was given a speed
boat ride by the operator of a boat whose wife was the registered
owner. The girl was permitted to sit forward of the windshield on
the smooth deck. During a high speed turn, the girl slid off the
deck and was fatally injured by the propeller. Notwithstanding the
fact that the wife-owner was present and that her husband's reckless
operation was the cause of the accident, the court ruled that she was
not in privity with reference to her husband's conduct and thus
granted limitation of liability to the value of the boat."
Although a boat owner may be able to limit his liability under
this statute, he should not rely on it to any great extent, especially
in determining the extent of insurance coverage. Although, as mentioned previously, the Limitation of Liability Act has been applied
to pleasure craft in a considerable number of cases, the fact is that
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943).
The Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 1946).
9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
GILMORE & BLACK, Op. cit. supra note 50, at 684-87.
Id. at 687-95.
The San Pedro, 223 U.S. 365 (1912).
Petition of Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
Id. at 833.
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today most boat owners operate their own boats and therefore it
would be impossible in most cases to sustain the burden of proving
that the owner had no privity or knowledge of the fault causing
the injury. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has not
yet specifically ruled that the act applies to pleasure boats.'a
B.

Wrongful Death

The admiralty law does not make any provision for survival
actions, or for actions for wrongful death on the inland waters or
the Great Lakes.6" It is therefore generally recognized today that
state death acts, rather than federally prescribed procedures, are
applicable to deaths occurring on state territorial waters.6 5 The
admiralty courts will recognize and enforce the applicable state
statutes,s and the same remedies and choices of forum are available.
The right of action under the state death act67 is governed and
measured by the substantive law of the state rather than admiralty
law." This presents a strange anomaly. If a person injured in a
boating accident sues for his own injuries, he may recover despite
his contributory negligence; his contributory negligence is merely
a factor in mitigation of damages69 But if he should die as a
result of the same injuries, his contributory negligence will defeat
recovery in a death action.7" In Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.,71 the libelant's wife was killed when he rammed his motorboat, valued at $5,000, into the respondents pier at night. The
libelant claimed that the pier which extended out into Lake Erie was
without proper lighting. The court concluded that the right of recovery for wrongful death was a state-created right and not a right
72
rooted in maritime law. Recovery under the Ohio death statute
was therefore denied due to the contributory negligence of the
63. See Harolds, supra note 50, at 429-30; Stolz, supra note 34, at 705-12.
64. The federal Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Star. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 55
761-67 (1958), specifically excludes inland waters and the Great Lakes.
65. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Just v. Chambers, 31.2 U.S. 383
(1941); see generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1960).
66. Just v. Chambers, supra note 65; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d
916 (6th Cir. 1957).
67. E.g., CODE § 2125.01.
68. E.g., Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957).
69. Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942).
70. E.g., Niepert v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957).
71. 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957).
72. CODE 5 2125.01.
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libelant. However, the libelant was allowed partial recovery (onehalf of the amount of the property damage - $2500) for the damage to his motorboat under the maritime doctrine of division of
damages.
Although the application of state substantive law in death
actions for deaths occurring on navigable waters still prevails, it is
possible that the United States Supreme Court may, in the interest
of uniformity, decide to apply the doctrine of comparative negligence to death actions based on state created rights since there is
no compulsion for the admiralty courts to adopt the state substantive law.7
C.

Collision -

Division of Damages

Liability in collision cases is based on fault, i.e., either a breach
of specific rules of navigation which directly causes or contributes
to the accident, or on the negligence of the navigator or operator.7"
Courts dealing with collision cases are primarily concerned with
the rules of the road75 and their application with respect to the circumstances leading to the collision. Different rules apply to different areas of navigable waters," and although they are basically
quite similar, there are a few important differences. The primary
differences relate to lighting requirements and the various sound
signals required of vessels in sight of one another.77
A number of the ordinary common law tort principles have
been applied to pleasure boat collision and explosion cases, namely:
73. Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); see also Sovel, Determining
the Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Territorial Waters, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 479,
485-92 (1964).
74. GRIFFIN, COLLISION 469 (1949).
75. The rules of the road have been codified by formal statutes: International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (International Rules), 77 Stat. 194 (1963), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1051-94 (Supp. V 1964); Navigation Rules for Harbors, Rivers and Inland
Waters (Inland Rules), 28 Stat. 672 (1895), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232
(1958); Navigation Rules for Great Lakes and Their Connecting and Tributary Waters
(Great Lakes Rules), 28 Star. 645 (1895), 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1958); Navigation
Rules for Red River of the North and Rivers Emptying into Gulf of Mexico and Tributaries (Western River Rules), 13 Star. 58 (1864), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56
(1958); see also Ohio Operating Regulations, CODE § 1547.05.
76. See note 75 supra.
77. An example of this would be the sound signal of one short blast. In international
waters, this means the vessel is altering its course to starboard, while on the Great Lakes
it may mean one of seven different things. Compare U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP'T OF
TREASURY, RULES OF THE ROAD: GREAT LAKES (CG.-172) (1962), with U.S.
COAST GUARD, DEP'T OF TREASURY, RULES OF THE ROAD: INTERNATIONAL-INLAND CG.-169 (1962). For a detailed comparison table of International and Inland
rules see KNIGHT, MODERN SEAMANSHIP 314-417 (12th ed. 1953).
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res ipsa loquitur,7 s last clear chance,7" proximate cause," and vis
major.S The most striking difference between the ordinary common law approach to automobile collisions and the maritime law
approach to boat collisions is the application to the latter of the
doctrine of division of damages 2 rather than the doctrine of contributory negligence which under the common law is an absolute
bar to recovery. In cases involving maritime collisions occurring
on navigable waters where both parties are at fault, the total loss
is shared equally, notwithstanding the exact degree of fault of each
party or the extent of loss.8 3 Thus, each party pays one-half of the
other's damage provided the defendant files a counterclaim. But
this general rule is subject to a number of specific rules: the rule
of inscrutable fault, the rule of inevitable accident, and the rule of
major-minor fault.
(1) Inscrutable Fault.-This rule is applied where the evidence is so conflicting that it is impossible to ascertain which vessel
was at fault. The courts will leave the parties as they find them,
each party thereby sustaining his own loss. 4
(2) Inevitable Accident.-The rule of inevitable accident is
the established principle that no action will lie for injuries attributable to an "act of God." Under this rule, the resulting division of
damages is the same as inscrutable fault - each party bears his
own loss. 5
78. E.g., Beal v. Thrasher, 182 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1950); Petition of Bogan, 103 F.
Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1952); Kulack v. The Pearl Jack, 79 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. Mich.
1948), afl'd, 178 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1949).
79. Kosnac v. The Norcuba, 243 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1957); Vignone v. Pierce & Norton Co., 130 Conn. 309, 33 A.2d 427 (1943). But see Dickey v. Thornburgh, 82 Cal.
App. 2d 723, 187 P.2d 132 (1947); see also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1261 (1958).
80. E.g., Norfolk, B. & C. Line v. Yachts, Inc., 226 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1955); Boyer
v.The Seneca Sun, 143 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Pa. 1956).
81. E.g., Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957);
Ryan v. New England Dredge & Dock Co., 149 F.Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1957).
82. In collision cases, property damage is not proportioned to the fault, but rather is
equally divided between the parties. In personal injury cases, however, the comparative
negligence rule is generally applied rather than equal division. See GILMORE & BLACK,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 366, 382, 402-04, 434-42; Mattioni, Incidents of Maritime
Collision Law, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 456,472 (1964).
83. The North Star, 106 U.S. 17 (1882); N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963); United States v. The S.S. Washington, 241 F.2d
819 (4th' Cir. 1957); see GRIFFIN, COLLISION 558-66 (1949); Sprague, Divided

Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 15 (1928).
84. The'Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1868); The Jumna, 149 Fed. 171
(2d Cir. 1906); see GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 620.
85. Stainback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 532 (1852); Loc-Wood Boat & Motors,
Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957); Calanchini v. Bliss, 88 F.2d 82 (9th
Cir. 1937); see GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 537-50.
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(3) Major-Minor Fault.-This rule is applied where one vessel
is slightly negligent and the other is guilty of gross and inexcusable
negligence. The slight negligence of the one vessel will be disregarded as a minor fault whereas the vessel that was grossly negligent or committed a major fault will sustain the entire loss of both
parties."
III.

A.

SAPETY REGULATIONS

Declarationsof Policy

The increased participation in boating in the 1950's brought
with it a rise in the number of nautical mishaps. Consequently,
the need for increased boating regulation and safety became a
matter of"national concern. By 1957 the number of annual fatalities involving pleasure boats rose to approximately 1200.7 In the
five year period 1960-1964, there were 143 deaths attributed to
boating accidents on the territorial waters of Ohio. 88 In response
to this situation and similar statistics in other states, Congress enacted the Motorboat Act of 1958.89 The 1958 act, the primary
purpose of which is to promote safety on the navigable waters, supplements the Motorboat Act of 1940. 90 The 1958 act provides that
it is the duty of an operator of a vessel in case of collision to render
such assistance as may be practicable and necessary to other persons
affected by the collision. 9' The operator involved in a mishap on
the waterways is also required to file an accident report with either
the United States Coast Guard, or the state if its watercraft law has
been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury.92 The act further
provides for state registration and numbering of all undocumented
86. The Great Republic, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20 (1874); Skibs A/S Siljestad v. Steamboat Mathew Luckenbach, 324 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1963); Green v. Crow, 243 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1957); Webb v. Davis, 236 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1956); see GRIFFIN, Op. Cit.
supra note 83, at 505-12.
87. H.R. REP. No. 378, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1957). For a detailed study of
death cases in the United States for the year 1963 see U.S. COAST GuARD, DEP'T OF
TREASURY,

RECREATIONAL

BOATING

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES

(CG-357)

15-17

(1964).
88. Letter From The Ohio Division of Watercraft to the Author, March 1, 1965.
89. 72 Stat. 1754 (1958), 46 U.S.C. §§ 527-527(h) 1958.
90. 54 Stat. 163 (1940), 46 U.S.C. §§ 526-526(u) (1958). The 1940 act classifies
motorboats according to length into four classes. Requirements for lights, whistles and
bells, fire extinguishers, flame arrestors and the like are prescribed according to class.
The act also provides criminal sanctions for the violation of any of the safety requirements or for reckless operation.
91. 72 Stat. 1756 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 5261(b) (1958).
92. 72 Stat. 1756 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 5261(c) (1958).
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vessels 3 propelled by machinery of more than ten horsepower, 4
and sets forth standards for approval of state numbering systems."5
When a state system is approved by the Secretary of the Treasury,
the state rather than the Coast Guard assumes the responsibility for
administering the vessel numbering program.
B.

The Ohio Watercraft Act

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 1958 act is Congress'
declaration of policy therein encouraging uniformity of boating
laws, rules, and regulations among the several states and the federal
government to the greatest practicable extent.9" In response to this
policy, Ohio enacted the Ohio Watercraft Act"7 in 1959 which incorporates the standards for numbering set forth by Congress, and
which has been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. 8 The
Ohio act, however, is more comprehensive in coverage. It requires
that all watercraft " operating on the waters of the state be numbered,' 0 and all outboard motors used on watercraft be separately
registered. 10 1
The Ohio act also incorporates and supplements various navigation and safety regulations of the federal Motorboat Act of 1940
and federal navigation rules relative to running lights,0 2 rules of the.
road,' 3 reckless operation,' and the requirement of various safety
appliances, namely, life preservers,0 5 fire extinguishers,' flame arrestors, 10 7 and ventilators for engine compartments.'0 8 In addition
93. The term "undocumented vessel" means any vessel which is not required to have,
and does not have, a valid marine document issued by the Bureau of Customs. 72 Stat.
1754 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 527(1) (1958).
94. 72 Stat. 1754 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 527a(a) (1958).
95. 72 Stat. 1754 (1958), 46 U.S.C. §§ 527a(c) (1)-(11) (1958).
96. 72 Star. 1755 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 527f (1958).
97. CODE ch. 1547.
98. 46 C.F.R. § 171.10-1(b) (rev. ed. 1965).
99. "'Watercraft' means any contrivance used or designed for navigation on water,
including, but not limited to any vessel, boat, motor vessel, steam vessel, vessel operated
by machinery either permanently or temporarily affixed, scow, tugboat or any marine
equipment which is capable of carrying passengers .... " CODE § 1547.01 (A).
100. CODE 5 1547.53.
101. CODE 5 1547.54.
102. CODE 5 1547.02.
103. CODE § 1547.05.
104. CODE 5 1547.07.
105. CODE 5 1547.25.
106. CODE 5 1547.27.
107. CODE § 1547.28.
108. CODE 5 1547.29.
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to the incorporation of these rules and standards, the Ohio act sets
forth operating regulations for water skiing,"' provides for marking
of bathing and water skiing areas,"' requires direct supervision of
child operators by a person over sixteen years of age,"' and requires
children under ten years of age to wear life jackets. 1 2 The act also
expressly prohibits the use of flashing lights 3 or sirens,"' the sale
of single-celled inflatable watercraft,"' the severing of mooring lines
which would result in property damage,'1 6 standing or walking on
any portion of a watercraft not specifically designed for such movement while the craft is underway," 7 and the operation of any watercraft by incapacitated persons," 8 or persons under the influence of
alcohol or drugs."'
The Watercraft Act establishes the Division of Watercraft as a
subdivision of the Department of Natural Resources. 2 ' This division
is authorized to promulgate and adopt administrative regulations
deemed necessary to supplement the act.12 ' Enforcement of the provisions of the act may be accomplished by any peace officer, sheriff,
division of parks officer, division of wildlife officer, or conservancy
district officer. These officials are authorized to stop and board any
watercraft in the execution of enforcement duties.1 2 In addition,
Coast Guard officers are authorized to stop and board any vessel on
navigable waters for the purpose of enforcing the Ohio numbering
109. CODE §§ 1547.14-.19.
110. CODE § 1547.08, .14.
1547.06.
111. CODE
112. CODE § 1547.24.
113. CODE § 1547.03.
114. CODE § 1547.04.
115. CODE § 1547.21.
116. CODE § 1547.10.
117. CODE § 1547.22.
118. CODE § 1547.12.
119. CODE § 1547.11.
120. CODE § 1547.51.
121. CODE § 1547.52. The Division of Watercraft has promulgated special rules
and regulations governing various waters of the State of Ohio. Regulations effective as
of August 19, 1963, govern the establishment of water ski, swimming, and other
restricted zones, and the speed of watercraft on the Hocking River, the Sandusky River,
and the Dillon Reservoir. Regulations effective as of February 11, 1964, govern the
operation of watercraft on the waters of the Berlin Reservoir. Regulations effective as
of May 11, 1964, govern the public use of waters under the supervision and control of
the Ohio Division of Parks and Recreation, and govern anchoring, docking, mooring,
beaching, tying-up, and leaving watercraft unattended on certain designated lands or
waters owned by the Ohio Division of Wildlife.
122. CODE § 1547.35, .63.
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regulations, as well as the regulations prescribed by the Motorboat
Act of 1940 and the rules of the road.'2 3
IV.

CONCLUSION

As tort litigation increases in the area of boating accidents, it
is almost inevitable that there will be changes in the application of
some of the maritime principles. This is due primarily to the fact
that admiralty law has evolved largely as a result of the litigation
of commercial interests. One area of probable change is the applicability of the Limitation of Liability Act'2 4 to litigation involving
pleasure boat owners. As this statute was enacted solely for the
protection of commercial maritime adventurers, there does not appear to be any logical reason for extending its application to incidents involving pleasure craft. Therefore, it seems entirely probable
that sometime in the future Congress may exclude pleasure boat
owners from the privilege of limiting liability to the value of the
boat. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on
whether or not the act applies to pleasure boat owners.
Another area of possible change concerns the uniformity of the
laws of the sea. Application of the substantive law of the various
states in wrongful death actions where the death occurs on navigable
waters does not promote uniformity. Since the admiralty courts are
not constitutionally obligated to apply the state substantive law,12
notwithstanding the fact that the action is based on a state created
right, it is conceivable that in the future federal maritime principles,
i.e., the doctrine of comparative negligence rather than the bar of
contributory negligence, will be applied in death actions.'
In retrospect, it appears that the navigation and safety regulations are very comprehensive and provide an excellent guide to
boating safety with adequate civil and criminal sanctions to obtain
compliance. However, there is one major omission - the licensing
of boat operators. It would seem highly desirable to require operators of boats capable of high speeds to first meet minimum standards
with respect to knowledge of the rules and safety requirements of
the waterways. Today there is no such requirement, either state or
123. 72 Star. 1757 (1958), 46 U.S.C. § 527d(c) (1958).
124. 9 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1958).
125. See authorities cited at note 73 supra.
126. Cf. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960). For an excellent analysis of state
created defenses in admiralty see Sovel, Determining the Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Territorial Waters, 37 TEMP. IQ. 479, 485-92 (1964).
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federal, in Ohio. 127 Any person able to purchase a high powered
speedboat may immediately set out on the waterways without knowledge of nautical rules, customs and courtesies, thus, becoming a
potential menace to other yachtsmen as well as himself. Only
after he violates the rules or causes an accident may action be taken
to correct the deficiency.
RICHARD

C.

BINZLEY

127. There is one exception: operators of motorboats and small craft carrying passengers for hire must be licensed by the U.S. Coast Guard. 54 Star. 165 (1940), 46
U.S.C. § 526f (1958).

